This paper develops a model for understanding end-user order ‡ow in the FX market. The model addresses several puzzling …ndings. First, the estimated price-impact of ‡ow from di¤erent end-user segments is, dollar-for-dollar, quite di¤erent. Second, order ‡ow from segments traditionally thought to be liquiditymotivated actually has power to forecast exchange rates. Third, about one third of order ‡ow's power to forecast exchange rates one month ahead comes from ‡ow's ability to forecast future ‡ow, whereas the remaining two-thirds applies to price components unrelated to future ‡ow. We show that all of these features arise naturally from end-user heterogeneity, in a setting where order ‡ow provides timely information to market-makers about the state of the macroeconomy.
Introduction
This paper addresses order ‡ow heterogeneity and its empirical implications. By order ‡ow heterogeneity, we mean transactions initiated by agents of di¤erent types (e.g., non-…nancial corporations versus hedge funds versus mutual funds). Recent theoretical work on exchange rates stresses the analytical importance of heterogeneity across agents, stemming from both dispersed information and non-informational shocks to asset demands (e.g., Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2003 , Hau and Rey 2002 , Dunne, Hau, and Moore 2004 , Evans and Lyons 2004a . Empirical predictions from these models are borne out: trades have causal and persistent e¤ects on price, a …nding that runs counter to textbook exchange rate models (e.g., Lyons 2002a,b, Payne 2003 , among many others).
2 Theory generally assumes, however, that agents are symmetrically heterogeneous; that is to say, they di¤er, but in the same way. In contrast, trades in the foreign exchange (FX) market come from categories of agents that are quite di¤erent: they have di¤erent motivations, di¤erent attitudes toward risk, and di¤erent horizons. Extant theory provides little guidance for empiricists seeking to exploit transaction data that is disaggregated into segments.
3
Several puzzling empirical …ndings suggest that new modeling is needed. First, the price impact of order ‡ow is, dollar-for-dollar, quite di¤erent across end-user segments. This is not what one would expect to see if agents are symmetrically heterogeneous. Second, order ‡ow from segments traditionally thought to be liquidity-motivated actually has power to forecast exchange rates. Third, about one third of order ‡ow's power to forecast exchange rates comes from ‡ow's ability to forecast future ‡ow, whereas the remaining two-thirds applies to price components unrelated to future ‡ow. In this paper, we present a model where all these features arise naturally from heterogeneity across end-user segments, in a setting where order ‡ow provides timely information to market-makers about the state of the macroeconomy.
A one-period version of the Kyle (1985) model illustrates why intuition based on standard microstructure models is an unreliable guide to empirical work using order ‡ow data from di¤erent end-user (henceforth "customers") segments. In this model, the change in price quoted by a market-maker (i.e., the change in the log exchange rate s t ) depends on the total order ‡ow arriving in the market, x t :
where , the price-impact coe¢ cient, governs the sensitivity of the market-maker's price quote to order ‡ow. By assumption, the market-maker cannot distinguish di¤erent order ‡ow components, but must instead respond to the aggregated total ‡ow x t . Expected order ‡ow in this model is zero. Even in dynamic versions of the Kyle model, the market-maker expects order ‡ow to be zero in each period (a property that also applies 2 In textbook models, all of which assume that variables relevant to exchange rates are common knowledge (CK), trades per se have no causal e¤ect on price. Demand shifts have causal e¤ects on price. But because demand shifts come from public information only, prices adjust before transactions occur, so no causality from trades to price is present. Put di¤erently, in CK environments demand and order ‡ow are quite di¤erent, whereas in purely non-CK environments they are the same.
3 Recent research using transaction data from di¤erent segments includes Froot and Ramadorai (2002) , Carpenter and Wang (2003) , Mende and Menkho¤ (2003) , Bjønnes, Rime, and Solheim (2004) , Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) , and Sager and Taylor (2005) . 1 to standard versions of the other canonical information model, the Glosten and Milgrom 1985 model) . This conditional i.i.d. structure is an analytically attractive feature of these models. Now suppose that a researcher has a dataset that breaks total FX customer ‡ow at a given bank into three segments, say short-term investors (e.g., hedge funds), long-term investors (e.g., mutual funds), and international-trade-based (e.g., non-…nancial corporations); x i t for i = 1; 2; 3. The researcher then runs the regression:
With the perspective of the Kyle model, it would be natural to interpret the i coe¢ cients as price-impact parameters. However, this would be problematic for three reasons: First, the three regressors are not likely to be independent intratemporally. Indeed, in our data the order ‡ows from di¤erent segments are signi…cantly correlated. If the x i t s are known to covary, and each of the 's are non-zero, then no one coe¢ cient summarizes the total price-impact of changes in a single ‡ow segment. Second, the three regressors are not likely to be independent intertemporally. In fact, the ‡ow segments in our dataset are signi…cantly auto-correlated. In this context, the speci…cation in (1) is a reduced-form for potentially complex microeconomic dynamics. As non-structural estimates, the 's are not reliable measures of the price-impact of incremental trades. Third, the speci…cation misses the fact that regressors in equation (1) come from a single bank, whereas the ‡ows that move the exchange rate are the market-wide ‡ows from all segments. This is problematic in terms of price-impact parameters: positive correlation between ‡ow segments across banks means that when the regression omits other-bank ‡ows, the ‡ows from the source bank are getting too much price-impact credit (a form of omitted variable bias). More fundamentally, the FX market is not transparent, at least not with respect to customer ‡ows, so that the ‡ows that drive s t proximately are in fact the interdealer ‡ows. The exchange rate re ‡ects the information in any individual bank's customer ‡ows only when other dealers learn that information.
We present both simulation results and empirical estimates. The simulation results address the relation in our model between exchange rates and customer order ‡ows. The empirical estimates are based on roughly six years of customer transaction data from Citibank. Our simulations show that: customer ‡ows provide more precise information about fundamentals when the mix of customers is tilted toward longer-horizon participants; ‡ows from customer segments can produce negative coe¢ cients in contemporaneous return regressions, even when positively correlated with fundamentals; and customer ‡ows forecast returns because they are correlated with the future market-wide information ‡ow that dealers use to revise their FX prices.
Based on our empirical analysis we …nd that:
both the aggregate and disaggregated customer ‡ows received by Citibank are positively auto-correlated; contemporaneous correlations across ‡ow segments are low at the daily frequency, but high at the monthly frequency; some customer segments do produce negative coe¢ cients in contemporaneous return regressions; the proportion of excess return variation that segment ‡ows explain rises with the horizon; and about one-third of order ‡ow's power to forecast exchange rates one month ahead comes from ‡ow's ability to forecast future ‡ow, with the remaining two-thirds applying to price components unrelated to future ‡ow.
The remainder of the paper is in three sections. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 describes our data, and presents our empirical analysis and the model simulations. Section 3 concludes. We provide technical details on how we solve the model in an appendix.
Model
The model we develop is based on Evans and Lyons (2004a,b) . These papers embed the salient features of the spot FX market in a general equilibrium setting to study how information concerning the macroeconomy is transmitted to exchange rates via trading. The model we present here considers this transmission process in greater detail, emphasizing the role of end-user heterogeneity.
Our model focuses on the behavior of two groups of participants in the spot FX market: dealers and enduser customers. Dealers act as …nancial intermediaries. They quote prices at which they are willing to trade, and they initiate trade with each other. All non-dealer market participants are termed customers. This group comprises individuals, …rms, and …nancial institutions such as hedge and mutual funds. Customers have the opportunity to initiate trade with dealers at the prices they quote. The resulting pattern of trade de…nes customer order ‡ow. In particular, positive customer order ‡ow occurs at a given bank when the value of customer orders to purchase foreign currency at the quoted spot rate exceeds the value of orders to sell.
Customer order ‡ow is only observed by the recipient dealer. Any information contained in customer order ‡ow only becomes known to dealers across the market as the result of interdealer trading. This information aggregation process was the focus of earlier models of FX trading (e.g., Lyons 2002a, and 2004a) .
In this paper we focus on how the information contained in customer order ‡ow is related to customer-type.
For this purpose we distinguish between liquidity-motivated traders, short-term investors, and long-term investors. We then examine how di¤erences across customer types a¤ects the information contained in customer order ‡ow, and how this, in turn, a¤ects the joint dynamics of order ‡ows and exchange rates.
Dealers
There are a large number of dealers who act as intermediaries in the spot FX market. As such, each dealer quotes prices at which he stands ready to buy or sell foreign currency to customers and other dealers. Dealers also have the opportunity to initiate transactions with other dealers at the prices they quote. Thus, unlike standard international macro models, the behavior of the spot exchange rate is determined entirely by the FX prices dealers quote.
In Evans and Lyons (2004a) we derive an expression for the foreign currency prices dealers quote from their preferences and the trading rules in the market. These rules determine the sequence of quoting and trading during each period. We are interested in the transmission of information over periods of a month or more, so we refer to each period as a month. At the start of each month dealers quote FX prices to customers.
Under our trading rules these prices are good for any amount and are publicly observed. Each dealer then receives orders from a distinct subset of customers. Customer orders are only observed by the recipient dealer and so may represent a source of private information. Dealers next quote prices in the interdealer market.
These prices, too, are good for any quantity and are publicly observed. Dealers then have the opportunity to trade among themselves. Interdealer trading is simultaneous and trading with multiple partners is feasible.
This sequencing of events obviously oversimpli…es actual trading in the market. In reality dealers quote prices to customers and other dealers, receive orders from customers and other dealers, and initiate their own trades on an continual basis. Our simpli…ed sequencing allows us to focus on how information conveyed by customer orders is transmitted among dealers and embedded in spot rates. In this sense, trading between dealers and customers, and among dealers in our model, are metaphors for the many rounds of quoting and trading that take place during an actual month. As in Evans and Lyons (2004a) , we allow for greater transparency in interdealer trading than is present in the actual FX market to compensate for the simpli…ed sequencing.
In our trading environment, optimal quote decisions take a simple form; all dealers quote the same price for foreign currency to both customers and other dealers. We represent the month-t quote as
where 1 > b > 0: s t is the log price of foreign currency quoted by all dealers, and f t denotes exchange rate fundamentals. While equation (2) takes the present value form familiar from standard international macro models, here it represents how dealers quote the price for foreign currency in equilibrium. In the market setting we consider, all dealers choose to quote the same price because doing otherwise opens them up to arbitrage, a costly proposition. Consequently, the month-t quote must be a function of information known to all dealers. We incorporate this requirement in (2) with the expectations operator E d t ; that denotes expectations conditioned on information common to all dealers at the start of month t, t . This is not to say that all dealers have the same information. Far from it. The customer order ‡ows received by individual dealers represent an important source of private information, so there is likely to be a good deal of information heterogeneity across dealers at any one time. Equation (2) implies that dealer quotes only re ‡ect that part of fundamental information that is common to all dealers.
The de…nition of fundamentals in equation (2) depends on the macroeconomic structure of the model.
For example, f t may include home and foreign money supplies and household consumption, as in Evans and Lyons (2004b) , or "output gaps" and in ‡ation rates as in Engel and West (2005) . For our purpose here we 4 need not take a stand on the composition of fundamentals. It su¢ ces that all dealers agree on the elements of f t ; and its equilibrium process. For simplicity, we assume that this process is a random walk: Innovations to fundamentals come from two sources. u t shocks are immediately observed by all dealers and customers (i.e., u t is publicly observed at the start of month t): These shocks represent public news that has an immediate and known consequence for fundamentals. The v t shocks to fundamentals are not immediately observed. Individual dealers and customers may have some information on v t as it occurs, but the information is imprecise and private. This information may come from private research, in the case of hedge or mutual funds, or from orders for goods and services in case of individual …rms (i.e., in the form of micro information). Over time, information on v t is collected and aggregated by government agencies.
The distinction between the u t and v t shocks plays an important role in our model. The month-t spot exchange rate is determined by the foreign currency price that all dealers quote at the start of month t: This price can incorporate information contained in the u t shock because it is observed by all dealers and has a known consequence for fundamentals. By contrast, v t shocks will not a¤ect the month t spot rate because they are not known to all dealers. Our focus is on how information concerning the v t shocks becomes known to dealers, and how this information is re ‡ected in the dynamics of spot rates.
Dealers learn about the v t shocks from two sources. The …rst is via the scheduled macroeconomic announcements made by government agencies. These announcements provide information about past values of v t because it takes time for the agencies to compile and aggregate the information. We shall assume that macro announcements at the start of month t reveal the true value of v t 2 : This means that the true state of fundamentals in month t 2; f t 2 ; is common knowledge after the month t announcement. The second source of information to dealers comes from order ‡ow. Recall that customer order ‡ow is a source of private information to dealers. In general, customer order ‡ows will not be perfectly correlated across dealers because customers have heterogenous reasons for trading. Consequently, information contained in individual customer order ‡ows only becomes known to all dealers if and when it is re ‡ected in interdealer trading. The process by which private information from customer order ‡ows becomes common knowledge to all dealers is analyzed in detail in Evans and Lyons (2004a) . Here we make a reduced-form assumption about this information aggregation process. In particular, we assume it takes a month of interdealer trading before all dealers know the aggregate of customer orders hitting the market. Let x t denote aggregate customer order ‡ow from month t trading (i.e., x t is the sum of the signed customer orders placed with individual dealers at the start of month t). We assume that interdealer trading in month-t is su¢ ciently informative to reveal the value of x t to all dealers by the start of month t + 1: Interdealer trading does not reveal the constituent components of x t .
In summary, the information available to all dealers at the start of each month is given by:
Since the spot exchange rate in month t is simply the FX price quoted by all dealers given common information d t ; the evolution of d t shown here plays a key role in driving exchange rates.
Customers
The customer orders received by actual foreign exchange dealers come from a variety of sources: individuals, non-…nancial …rms, and …nancial …rms such as pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds. We will not attempt to model each separately. Instead, we note that the customer pool comprises heterogeneous agents with di¤erent preferences. We represent this heterogeneity by splitting the customer pool into three groups:
short-term investors, long-term investors, and international-trade-based agents.
Both short-and long-term investors choose to allocate their wealth between domestic and foreign bonds based on their private forecasts of returns. In particular, we assume that there is a continuum of short-term investors on the unit interval indexed by i. The desired foreign bond position for investor i is given by
where s > 0 and E i;t denotes expectations conditioned on short-term investor i's information at the start of month t; s i;t : For simplicity we assume that domestic and foreign interest rates are equal so s t+1 s t represents the excess return on foreign bond holdings. Of course, if investors held equities or other risky assets in addition, returns on these assets would also a¤ect their desired portfolio position. Again we ignore this possibility for the sake of clarity. The s parameter measures the sensitivity of the investor's portfolio choice to expected returns. Greater risk aversion and/or uncertainty concerning future returns is represented by a smaller value for s :
Long-term investors have a two-rather than one-month horizon. In equilibrium, it takes two months before shocks to fundamentals are fully and permanently re ‡ected in the spot rate. A two-month horizon is therefore su¢ cient to represent the preferences of far-sighted investors. Again, there is a continuum of these investors on the unit interval. The desired foreign bond position of long-term investor j is given by
where l > 0 and E j;t denotes expectations conditioned on l j;t : As above, we ignore the possibility that long-term investors could hold other assets. The portfolio position of long-term investors may be more or less sensitive to variations in expected returns depending of the value of l :
Changes in the desired portfolio positions drive the customer order ‡ows from both short-and long-term 6 investors. In particular, the customer order ‡ows from each group in month t are given by
Notice that both order ‡ows aggregate the expectations of individual investors concerning the future path of the exchange rate. As such, they aggregate the private information that individuals use in forming these expectations. We assume that this private information comes in the form of signals concerning v t :
In particular, at the start of month t; each short-term investor i and long-term investor j receives a noisy signal concerning the value of v t ;ṽ i;t andṽ j;t , wherẽ
The idiosyncratic noise terms, i;t and j;t ; are i.i.d. normally distributed shocks with zero means and variances equal to 2 ; and R 1 0 i;t di = R 1 0 j;t dj = 0: Unlike dealers, investors do not observe order ‡ows. Rather they observe spot rates, public news, macro announcements and private signals. The information used in their portfolio decisions is therefore characterized by:
The third component of order ‡ow comes from the agents engaged in international trade in goods and services. We do not model this source of order ‡ow in any detail but rather assume a speci…cation with two key features. 4 First, order ‡ows from this source are persistent, and second they are correlated with exchange rate fundamentals. Speci…cally, we assume that the order ‡ow associated with real trade, hereafter trade-based order ‡ow, x with j j < 1; where
When is non-zero, changes in real economic activity that a¤ect exchange rate fundamentals also a¤ect the demand for foreign currency by trade-based agents, which in turn shows up order ‡ow. Our speci…cation also includes a liquidity shock " t , a component of trade-based order ‡ow unrelated to changing fundamentals.
Equations (7) and (10) describe the three components that comprise aggregate customer order ‡ow during 4 See Osler (1998) for a model in which the currency demands of exporters and importers are explicitly considered. 7 month t :
A key assumption in our model is that interdealer trading allows all dealers to learn the value of x t by the end of month t trading, but not the constituent components, x s t ; x l t and x t t
Solving the Model
An equilibrium in our model comprises: (i) a process for spot rates consistent with the quote equation (2) given the equilibrium evolution of common dealer information d t in (4), and (ii) a process for aggregate customer order ‡ow in (11) consistent with investor expectations. Finding these processes is complicated by the fact that the information conveyed to dealers by order ‡ow is itself a function of how investors use their private information in forecasting the future exchange rate. We solve the model by the "conjecture and veri…cation"method. Speci…cally, we …rst conjecture the form for equilibrium quotes consistent with (2) and an assumption about the form of d t : Next, we compute the components of customer order ‡ow consistent with the exchange rate process implied by these conjectures.
This provides us with an expression for aggregate customer order ‡ow, x t . Finally, we verify that our initial conjecture concerning dealer information, (i.e., the evolution of d and macro announcements make the true state of fundamentals common knowledge with a two month delay. This means that
Second, the public news shocks, u t ; are by de…nition common knowledge and unanticipated so (E
Third, dealer estimates of the v t shocks combine their priors with their observations of order ‡ow and macro announcements. At the start of month t; dealers know the order ‡ows from earlier trading months (i.e., x t 1 ; x t 2 ; :::); and the history of macro announcements (i.e., v t 2 ; v t 3 ; :::). These sources are uninformative about the value of v t or v t+1 because customers were unaware of these shocks when making their trading decisions in month t 1 and earlier. As a consequence,
Equation (13) is helpful for understanding the joint dynamics of exchange rates and order ‡ow. The equation provides a decomposition of the new information dealers use in revising the FX prices they quote between t and t + 1: As one would expect, the public news component, u t+1 , has an immediate impact on the depreciation rate because it leads all dealers to revise their estimate of fundamentals, f t+1 : The other two components of the information ‡ow come from revisions in dealer estimates of v t and v t 1 : These revisions come from two sources: the macro announcement on the value of v t 1 made at the start of t + 1; and the customer order ‡ow from month t trading,
identi…es what dealers learn about v t before it becomes known publicly via the macro announcement in t + 2: The last component,
; identi…es the new information in the macro announcement made at the start of t + 1: The relative importance of these last two components depends on the information content of customer order ‡ow.
The information in order ‡ow depends on the actions of customers. In particular, investor order ‡ows, x s t and x l t ; will only contain information on v t if investors …nd it useful to use their private information on v t to forecast returns. To analyze the information content in customer order ‡ow we must therefore examine how investors allocate their portfolios. For this purpose, we need a conjecture for the equilibrium depreciation process. This conjectured process needs to be consistent with (13) and so relies on an assumption about dealer expectations which must also be veri…ed. We conjecture (and verify below) that the equilibrium process for the depreciation rate can be written as
where and are parameters that need to be determined.
Recall that both short-and long-term investors receive a private signal concerning the value of v t at the start of month t: These signals are described in equation (8). This speci…cation implies that for shortterm investor i; E i;t v t = ṽ i;t ; and long-term investor j; E j;t v t = ṽ j;t where
Investor expectations concerning the value of v t 1 are similarly given by E i;t v t 1 = ṽ i;t 1 and E j;t v t = ṽ j;t 1 : It might seem strange that these estimates incorporate no information from month t variables. However, recall from equation (12) that the depreciation rate depends on the new information received during month t by all dealers: Thus, variables known to dealers are the start of t will be of no use to investors in forecasting s t+1 :
This leaves investors' month t signals,ṽ i;t andṽ j;t ; but these variables are uncorrelated with v t 1 ; so the month t 1 estimate remains the best estimate of v t 1 for each investor in month t: Investor expectations concerning the " t shocks are more straightforward. Only dealers observe customer order ‡ow, so individual investors have no information on the values of " t and " t 1 at the start of month t: 5 Investor expectations concerning the rate of depreciation can therefore be computed from (14) as:
Using these expressions to identify investor expectations in (5) and (6), and combining the results with (7) and (8), gives us the following expressions for the investor components of customer order ‡ow:
Notice that in aggregate the investor order ‡ows provide information on v t and v t 1 even though the value of these shocks is not known to individual investors. Aggregation of the order ‡ows eliminates the idiosyncratic component of investors'private information so that dealers can make more precise inferences about v t and v t 1 using aggregate order ‡ow than would be possible from the currency orders of individual customers.
Equations (15) and (16) All that now remains is to verify that equation (14) is consistent with equation (13) (10), (15) and (16). This is a relatively complex problem, so we relegate the technical details to the Appendix.
Customer Characteristics and Order Flow
We now turn to the properties of the equilibrium. Equation (14) shows that the equilibrium depreciation rate s t+1 is driven by three factors: public news u t+1 ; fundamental news v t ; and liquidity shocks, " t :
The parameter measures the equilibrium in ‡uence of liquidity shocks on the depreciation rate. Recall that liquidity shocks are uncorrelated with actual fundamentals, f t ; so if dealers observed f t contemporaneously (i.e., E d t f t = f t ), their FX quotes would not depend on liquidity shocks. Dealers can use order ‡ow, x t ; to revise their estimates of f t+1 between the start of months t and t + 1; and these revisions drive spot rates (see equation 12). So any shock that contributes to unexpected aggregate order ‡ow, x t E d t x t ; will a¤ect s t+1 provided order ‡ow contains some information on the behavior of fundamentals that cannot be learnt from other sources. In sum, therefore, will be non-zero in any equilibrium where dealers …nd customer order ‡ow informative about fundamentals. Note, however, that even in these cases, the e¤ect of a liquidity shock on the price of FX is short-lived. Equation (14) implies that the e¤ect of a " t shock increases dealer quotes for the log price of FX by " t in month t + 1; and lowers their quotes by " t in month t + 2. Intuitively, by the start of month t + 2; all dealers can infer the exact value of " t from macro announcements and their observations on order ‡ow. They can therefore re…ne their earlier inferences regarding fundamentals based on x t :
The parameter indicates the speed with which dealers learn about fundamentals from order ‡ow. In the extreme case where order ‡ow is completely uninformative, macro announcements would be the only source of information on v t : In this case would equal zero, and v t shocks would impact dealer quotes with a two month lag, which is the reporting lag for macro announcements. At the other extreme, if observations on x t allowed dealers to estimate the value of v t with complete precision by the start of month t + 1; would equal one. Under these circumstances, the month t + 1 announcement concerning the value of v t 1 would be informationally redundant as far as dealers were concerned, so the value of v t 1 would not a¤ect the change in their FX quotes, s t+1 :
We can now turn to the focus of our analysis; namely, the question of how the information content of order ‡ow is related to the characteristics of customers. In our model, the characteristics of customer order ‡ow depend on the investors'sensitivities, s and l ; the precision of private information, ; and the correlation between fundamentals and trade-based order ‡ow, governed by : Ideally, we would like to study the analytical dependence of and on these parameters, but the complexity of the model makes this impossible. We therefore base our analysis on calibrated solutions to the model. fundamentals from order ‡ow (i.e., is increasing in s and l ).
To understand the economics behind these results, we …rst note that = = 0:17 when customer order ‡ow is driven solely by trade-based agents. In this equilibrium, order ‡ow, x t ; is not particularly informative about fundamentals because it does not incorporate any of the private information on v t available to investors.
Consequently, most of the impact of v t shocks on spot rates is delayed for two months until it is fully revealed by macro announcements. The equilibrium value of rises with increases in both s and l because aggregate order ‡ow now contains private information from investors on the values of v t : Importantly, order ‡ow is more informative to dealers in these equilibria because investors have a greater incentive to act on their private information. Investors recognize that dealers place greater weight on order ‡ow when revising their FX quotes, and use their private information on v t to forecast these revisions. At the same time, their own portfolio choices are more sensitive to private information, with the result that in aggregate, order ‡ow provides a more precise signal to dealers concerning v t :
Figure 1 also shows how and are related to the degree of forward-looking behavior driving order ‡ow. The dashed and dashed-dot plots show the equilibrium values of and for cases where investors are either all short-term (i.e., l = 0) or long-term (i.e., s = 0). Here we see that order ‡ow is more informative when only long-term investors contribute to order ‡ow. The reason is that private information has a larger impact on investor expectations concerning two-month returns than one-month returns (i.e., @E j;t [s t+2 s t ] =@ṽ j;t = and @E j;t [s t+1 s t ] =@ṽ j;t = < ). Consequently, the order ‡ows generated by long-term investors will be more sensitive to v t shocks than the ‡ows from short-term investors (see equations 15 and 16).
To summarize, our model shows how the mix of customer-types a¤ects the information content of order ‡ow. In particular, we have demonstrated that customer order ‡ows provide more precise and timely information concerning fundamentals to dealers when the pool of customers is more forward-looking and willing to react to private information.
Empirical Analysis

Data
Our empirical analysis utilizes a dataset that comprises customer order ‡ows, spot rates and interest rates over approximately six years. The order ‡ows come from the customer orders received by Citibank in the USD/EUR market from April 1993 to June 1999. 7 . Citibank's share of customer orders in the USD/EUR market at that time was in the 10-15 percent range, no other bank had a larger market share in these currencies. The customer orders are aggregated at the daily frequency and measure in $m the imbalance between customer orders to purchase and sell euros. Days "begin" at 00:00 GMT and any trades executed with customers over a weekend -a relatively rare event -are included in Monday's order ‡ows. Thus a trading week comprises …ve days. Daily order ‡ows are split into three categories: non-…nancial corporations -henceforth "Corporations", unleveraged …nancial institutions (e.g., mutual funds)-henceforth "Investors", and leveraged …nancial institutions (e.g., hedge funds)-henceforth "Hedge". We also distinguish between trades executed with Citibank in the US, and those elsewhere within Citibank's global trading operation (referred to as "Non-US"). Thus, our customer order ‡ows are partitioned into six non-overlapping segments corresponding to three participant types and two trade locations. We take the day d spot rate as the o¤er rate (USD/EUR) quoted by Citibank at the end of trading (approximately 17:00 GMT) on day d 1:
Excess returns are computed from these quotes using Euro deposit rates of the appropriate maturity from Datastream. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on depreciation rates and the customer order ‡ows. Since overnight interest rates are approximately equal in our sample, the daily depreciation rate behaves very similarly to excess returns, and neither displays any signi…cant serial correlation. By contrast, both the aggregate and disaggregated customer order ‡ows received by Citibank are serially correlated. The estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cients are quite small, but many are positive and highly statistically signi…cant. These statistical patterns are repeated at the weekly and monthly frequency: Depreciation rates and excess returns are serially uncorrelated while some of the order ‡ow segments display a small but signi…cant degree of autocorrelation.
(We do not report these lower frequency results to conserve space.) Our theoretical model is consistent with these features of the data. The depreciation rate is serially uncorrelated by construction, as we noted above.
Aggregate customer order ‡ow is slightly positively autocorrelated under our baseline parameterization with s = l = 1 : The …rst order autocorrelation in x t is equal to 0.05.
The lower portion of Table 1 reports the contemporaneous order ‡ow correlations at the daily and monthly 7 Before January 1999, data for the euro are synthesized from data in the underlying markets against the dollar, using weights of the underlying currencies in the euro. Notes: The depreciation rate, s, are calculated as the daily change in the natural log of the spot price (USD/EUR) x 100. Order ‡ows are daily aggregates for the euro in $m. The statistics reported below i are the sample autocorrelations at lag i. P-values for the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation are reported in parenthesis. The lower panel reports correlations between the order ‡ows at the daily frequency below the leading diagonal and at the monthly frequency above the leading diagonal. The sample spans the period 4/01/93 -6/30/99, and includes observations on 1682 trading days.
frequency. At the daily frequency, the correlations between the ‡ow segments are quite small, but at the monthly frequency they range from approximately -0.95 to 0.95. This di¤erence in the correlation structure is important for understanding the results presented below. 
Customer Orders and Returns
We begin our empirical analysis of the relationship between exchange rates and customer order ‡ows in Table   2 . Here we report the results of regressing excess returns on Citibank's customer ‡ows at the one day, one week and one month horizon. Excess returns are computed as er d+h s d+h s d + ri The results in Table 2 contain several noteworthy features. First, the coe¢ cients on the order ‡ow seg-ments are quite di¤erent from each other. Some are positive, some are negative, some are highly statistically signi…cant, others are not. Second, while the coe¢ cients on order ‡ow are jointly signi…cant in every regression we consider, the proportion of the variation in excess returns that they account for rises with the horizon. For example, using all six order ‡ow segments, the R 2 statistics rise from 8 percent at one day, to 30 percent at the one month horizon. Third, the explanatory power of the order ‡ows shown here is much less than that reported for interdealer order ‡ows. Evans and Lyons (2002a) , for example, report that interdealer order ‡ow accounts for approximately 60 percent of the variations in the $/DM at the daily frequency.
These …ndings appear puzzling when judged against the perspective of a standard market-making model, like Kyle (1985) . In particular, the negative coe¢ cients in Table 2 seem to indicate, rather counter-intuitively, that market-makers view orders to purchase the euro from some customers as an indicator that the euro is overvalued. Similarly, it is hard to understand why orders from some customers appear to carry information at one frequency but not at others. Remember that there is no serial correlation in returns, so quote revisions at the monthly frequency are just the sum of daily revisions.
Our model provides the key to understanding the results in Table 2 . Recall from the model that the depreciation rate re ‡ects the revision in dealer quotes driven by new information concerning fundamentals.
This information arrives in the form of public news, macro announcements and interdealer order ‡ow, but not the customer order ‡ows of individual dealers such as Citibank: Any information concerning fundamentals contained in the customer ‡ows received by individual banks a¤ects the FX price quoted by dealers only once it is inferred from the interdealer order ‡ows observed by all dealers. This distinction between individual customer order ‡ows and aggregate interdealer order ‡ow is crucial to understanding the results in Table 2 .
Our model simulations are useful in quantify this distinction. Speci…cally, we …rst solve the model for our baseline parameterization with s = l = 1: We then use the equilibrium values of and to simulate data on the depreciation rate, s t+1 ; aggregate order ‡ow, x t ; and its components, x t t ; x s t and x l t for a sample spanning 10,000 months. Table 3 reports the results from regressing the depreciation rate on the customer order ‡ows in this simulated data. Table 3 show that the revision in dealer quotes between the start of months t and t + 1 is positively correlated with the individual components of customer order ‡ow. Notice that none of these individual ‡ows accounts for more that one third of the variation in quotes. This is not due to the presence of public news shocks, they account for less than one percent of the variance in s t+1 in our simulations. 8 Rather, the low R 2 statistics indicate that none of the order ‡ow components is strongly correlated with the ‡ow of information dealers use to revised their quotes. Of course dealers in our model are assumed to observe aggregate customer order ‡ow, x t ; rather than its components, but in row (iv) we see that x t accounts for only one third of the variation in quotes. Individual order ‡ows are not strongly correlated with the ‡ow of information dealers use to revise quotes. OLS standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Rows (i) -(iii) of
In row (v) we report the results from regressing the depreciation rate on all three components of customer order ‡ow. Here we see two important implications of the model. First, the coe¢ cients on the order ‡ow components are quite di¤erent from each other. The coe¢ cients on the short-term component, x s t ; is twice the size of the estimate from the univariate regression in row (ii), and the coe¢ cient on the long-term component, The results in Table 3 are robust to variations in the parameter values used to solve the model. They arise from two key features: First, realizations of aggregate order ‡ow, x t ; are much less informative about shocks to fundamentals than the ‡ow of information reaching dealers between the start of month t and t + 1:
In our model dealers make inferences regarding fundamentals by combining their observation on x t with the history of macro announcements (i.e., v t 1 ; v t 2; ::) and earlier ‡ows (i.e., x t 1 ; x t 2 ; :::): The resulting dealer estimates of v t are much more precise than any estimate of v t based solely on x t : Consequently, variations in x t account for a relatively small fraction of the variation in depreciation rates because they poorly approximate the actual ‡ow of information on fundamentals dealers use in revising the FX quotes.
The second key feature concerns the correlations between the order ‡ow components. In our simulations the correlation between the investor components is approximately 0.9, and the correlation between the tradebased and either investor component is approximately 0.3. These positive correlations are a robust feature of the model because, as equations (10), (15) and (16) show, the components of order ‡ow are driven by common shocks to fundamentals. At the same time, the components are less than perfectly correlated thanks to di¤erences in investor preferences and the presence of liquidity shocks. These characteristics imply that variations in the three order ‡ow segments are jointly a better approximation to the ‡ow of information a¤ecting dealer quotes than a single order ‡ow, even the aggregate order ‡ow observed by dealers. This is why the R 2 statistic in row (v) of Table 3 is almost 30 percent higher than the statistics from regressions using a single order ‡ow. The correlation across order ‡ow segments also means that the coe¢ cients on the order ‡ow components have no structural interpretation. Realizations of v t ; v t 1 ; " t and " t 1 characterize the ‡ow of information from aggregate order ‡ow and macro announcements dealers use to revise quotes (see equation 14). The di¤erent coe¢ cients on the order ‡ows simply re ‡ect how these shocks are re ‡ected in the depreciation rate and the order ‡ow components.
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Although there is no exact mapping from Citibank's customer ‡ows to the components of customer order ‡ow in our model, the discussion above provides theoretical perspective on the empirical …ndings in Table   2 . Citibank's customer ‡ows are representative of the customer orders received by other (large) dealers, but they are not the vehicle through which information is impounded into FX quotes. Rather they represent one factor driving interdealer order ‡ow that is itself an important source of information to dealers setting FX quotes across the market. Essentially the same relationship exists in our model between the components of customer order ‡ow and the aggregate order ‡ow used by dealers to revise quotes. The one di¤erence is that Citibank's'customer orders undoubtedly contain idiosyncratic elements that are absent from x t t ; x s t and x l t : According to this view then, the results in Table 2 re ‡ect the fact that Citibank's customer ‡ows approximate the ‡ow of information dealers are using across the market to revise their FX quotes. The individual coe¢ cients have no structural interpretation in terms of measuring the price-impact of di¤erent customer orders, they simply map variations in customer ‡ows into an estimate of the information ‡ow being used by dealers across the market. This interpretation can also account for the increase in explanatory power of customer ‡ows as we move from horizons of one day to one month. As the horizon lengthens, the idiosyncratic elements in Citibank's' customer ‡ows become relatively less important, with the result that the ‡ows are more precise proxies for the market-wide ‡ow of information driving quotes. This interpretation is also consistent with the observation from Table 1 that the correlations between customer ‡ow segments are much higher at the monthly frequency than at the daily frequency.
Forecasting Returns
One novel implication of our model is that it takes time before shocks to fundamentals are fully re ‡ected in exchange rates. This fact is clear from the equation for the equilibrium depreciation process:
Recall that in the extreme case where order ‡ow is completely uninformative about fundamentals, equals 0; so v t shocks a¤ect dealer quotes with a two month lag. At the other extreme, if observations on order ‡ow allow dealers to make completely precise estimates of v t by the start of month t + 1; equals one. In equilibrium, the value of lies between these extremes because order ‡ow is somewhat informative. In fact, our numerical results in Figure 1 showed that the equilibrium value of is higher when the pool of customers placing orders with dealers is more forward-looking.
In this section, we examine the implications of equation (14) for the intertemporal relationship between customer order ‡ows and returns. We begin by examining the relationship between future excess returns and current customer order ‡ows. In particular, Table 4 reports the results of regressing excess returns between month t and month t + 1; er t+1 ; on Citibank's customer order ‡ows during month t 1: Notice that unlike the regressions in Table 2 , the customer order ‡ows come from trading prior to the period covering the revision in quotes. The results in Table 4 show that customer order ‡ows have remarkable forecasting power for future quote revisions. The six ‡ow segments jointly account for approximately 19 percent of the variation in future excess returns. This level of forecasting power is an order of magnitude above that usually found in exchange rate equations. For example, the forecast power of interest di¤erentials for monthly excess returns is only in the 2 -4 percent range. We also note, once again, that there are large di¤erences in the estimated coe¢ cients across ‡ow segments and across speci…cations.
To gain theoretical perspective on these results, we return to simulations of our model. Table 5 reports the results of regressing the depreciation rate, s t+1 ; on the aggregate and disaggregate customer order ‡ows from trading in month t 1; {x t 1 x t t 1 ; x s t 1 ; x l t 1 g: As above, the regressions are estimated from 10,000 monthly observations of simulated data computed from a solution to the model using our benchmark parameterization.
Row (i) of Table 5 shows that aggregate customer order ‡ow has no forecasting power for the future depreciation rate; both the coe¢ cient estimate and R 2 statistic are very close to zero. By contrast, as the results in row (ii) show, the components of customer order ‡ow have substantial forecasting power. In this case the R 2 statistic is approximately 0.25 -a …gure somewhat higher than we found using all six segments of Citibank's customer ‡ows. The estimated coe¢ cients on the three order ‡ow segments are also quite di¤erent from each other, but each is highly statistically signi…cant. The results in Table 5 are easily understood using the equation for the equilibrium depreciation rate, equation (14). The equilibrium values for and are approximately 0.57 and 0.22 under our baseline parameterization. These values imply that order ‡ow is informative about fundamentals, but dealer inferences
are not so precise that all the e¤ects of v t shocks are immediately re ‡ected in FX quotes. In short, it takes time in this equilibrium for dealers to fully learn about shocks to fundamentals. As consequence, the marketwide ‡ow of information driving the revision in dealer quotes between t and t + 1 depends on the history of v t and " t shocks before they become common knowledge to dealers. This history-dependence shows up in the presence of the v t 1 and " t 1 terms in equation (14). Now, in sofar as order ‡ow segments from month t 1 trading are correlated with v t 1 and " t 1 ; these ‡ows will be correlated with the market-wide information ‡ow driving quote revisions, and so they will have forecasting power for the future depreciation rate as we see in Table 5 .
It should be stressed that this result does not rely on ine¢ cient inference by dealers. In our model, dealers make optimal use of their observations on aggregate order ‡ow and macro announcements to revised their FX quotes. Rather, the forecasting power from the ‡ow segments re ‡ects the fact that they jointly contain more information about fundamentals than the observed history of aggregate order ‡ow and macro 20 announcements up to the start of month t: Aggregating the segments destroys this information advantage, with the result that aggregate order ‡ow should have no forecasting power for the future depreciation rate.
Indeed, this is exactly what we see in row (i) of Table 5 .
We conjecture that this same mechanism accounts for the forecasting power of Citibank's customer ‡ows.
If these order ‡ows contain more information about fundamentals than was contemporaneously known to dealers across the market, and some of this information became widely known via the ensuing interdealer order ‡ow and incorporated into quotes, then the customer ‡ows should have forecasting power for future excess returns. Once again, the estimated coe¢ cients on the ‡ow segments do not have a structural interpretation, they simply map variations in the ‡ow segments into the ‡ow of information concerning fundamentals
that has yet to be fully assimilated by dealers across the market.
Returns, Order Flows and the Pace of Information Aggregation
We have argued that Citibank's customer orders have forecasting power for future returns because they are correlated with the market-wide information ‡ow that dealers use to revise their FX quotes. Moreover, this correlation arises because it takes time for information about fundamentals to be fully assimilated across the market. If, on the contrary, information about the latest change in fundamentals becomes available to dealers quickly because interdealer order ‡ow is very informative, customer ‡ows would have no forecasting power for future returns.
If the quality of market-wide information means that dealers are slow to fully learn about changes in fundamentals, customer order ‡ows will contain private information on not just the latest changes in fundamentals, but also past changes that are not yet common knowledge. In our model, the revision in quotes between t and t + 1 depends on both v t and v t 1 when 1 < < 0 (see equation 14). This means that investors use their private information on both v t and v t 1 when forecasting returns and placing their month-t FX orders. Aggregate customer order ‡ow in month t will therefore aggregate private information on not just the most recent shock to fundamentals, v t ; but also the earlier shock, v t 1 ; which is not yet known to all dealers. Notice that this backward-looking feature of order ‡ow does not arise because investors are backward-looking. It occurs, instead, because forward-looking investors recognize that information aggregation across dealers is not instantaneous.
These observations provide a new perspective on the contemporaneous relationship between returns and customer order ‡ows shown in Table 2 . In particular, they raise the possibility that Citibank's customer ‡ows proxy for the market-wide ‡ow of information received by dealers concerning a history of changes in fundamentals. If this is indeed the case, the projection of returns on contemporaneous customer ‡ows should be forecastable with lagged ‡ows. To investigate this possibility, we …rst compute the …tted values and residuals, b er t+1 and^ t+1 ; from the contemporaneous regression for excess returns between month t and t + 1 on the six customer ‡ow segments reported in the lower panel of Table 2 . We then regress b er t+1 and^ t+1
on the six ‡ow segments from trading during month t 1: The regression estimates are reported in Table 6 .
The results in row (i) show that Citibank's customer ‡ows have signi…cant forecasting power for the projection of returns on contemporaneous ‡ows estimated by b er t+1 : This …nding is consistent with the idea that the market-wide information ‡ow during month t contains information about earlier changes in fundamentals that are not yet common knowledge to dealers. Row (ii) of Table 6 reports the results of regressing the residuals from the contemporaneous regression,^ t+1 ; on the lagged customer ‡ows. Here too the ‡ows have signi…cant forecasting power. Over our sample they account for 13 percent of the variations in the residuals:
These …nding are broadly consistent with our model. In Table 7 we report the results from regressing c s t+1 and^ t+1 on the lagged customer ‡ow components, {x Table 3 . As in the Citibank data, we see that lagged customer ‡ows have forecasting power for both the projection of the depreciation rate on the contemporaneous ‡ow components, and the associated projection error. The only signi…cant di¤erence between these …ndings and the results in Table 6 is that the R 2 statistics are approximately 3.5 times larger -a point we shall return to.
The results in row (i) of Table 7 indicate that about one quarter of the market-wide information ‡ow captured by variations in the contemporaneous projection relates to historical changes in fundamentals.
Recall that these results are derived from simulations in which the equilibrium value of is approximately 0.57, so dealer learning about earlier changes in fundamentals makes a signi…cant contribution to quote revisions. Citibank's customer ‡ows are a less precise proxy for the market-wide information ‡ow than the customer ‡ow segments in our model, so the R 2 statistic of 0.07 in row (i) of Table 6 almost surely understates the importance of dealer learning in the actual market.
Dealer learning also explains the results in row (ii) of Table 7 . Here we see that lagged customer ‡ows have forecasting power for the component of the depreciation rate that is uncorrelated with contemporaneous order ‡ow from a given segment. Another pitfall stems from the fact that ‡ow regressors are correlated across time. In this case, speci…cations that include contemporaneous ‡ows only are reduced-forms for complex microeconomic dynamics, and cannot produce structural estimates of the price-impact of incremental trades.
A third pitfall is that the data available to the researcher may not be available across the market in real time.
In the FX market, for example, data on customer ‡ows from a given bank do not capture the proximate ‡ow driver of prices, interdealer order ‡ow.
To clarify these matters, we compared simulated results from a model with customer-type heterogeneity with empirical estimates based on Citibank's customer ‡ows. Our simulations showed that: (1) customer ‡ows provide more precise information about fundamentals when the mix of customers is tilted toward longerhorizon participants; (2) ‡ows from customer segments can produce negative coe¢ cients in contemporaneous return regressions, even when positively correlated with fundamentals; and (3) customer ‡ows forecast returns because they are correlated with the future market-wide information ‡ow that dealers use to revise their FX prices. Of these four simulation results, (2) is perhaps the most counter-intuitive. It arises because disentangling liquidity-motivated order ‡ow from informative order ‡ow in a dynamic setting is quite complex.
On the empirical side, we showed that: (1) both the aggregate and disaggregated customer ‡ows received by Citibank are positively auto-correlated; (2) contemporaneous correlations across ‡ow segments are low at the daily frequency, but high at the monthly frequency; (3) some customer segments do produce negative coe¢ cients in contemporaneous return regressions; (4) the proportion of excess return variation that segment ‡ows can account for rises with the horizon; and (5) about one-third of order ‡ow's power to forecast exchange rates one month ahead comes from ‡ow's ability to forecast future ‡ow.
An important direction for future work is to move toward true structural estimation. Part of the di¢ culty here is that there is no exact mapping between Citibank's customer ‡ows and the components of customer order ‡ow in our model. The components of customer ‡ow in our model are market-wide ‡ows, whereas
Citibank's customer ‡ows are but one sample from that market-wide ‡ow. Moreover, Citibank's segment ‡ows are surely correlated with those from other banks, in part because many participant types split their orders across multiple banks (to reduce trading costs). This correlation introduces the potential for omittedvariable bias into any structural estimates. More fundamentally, a structural model must recognize that the customer orders received by Citibank (and other large dealers) are not the vehicle through which information is impounded into FX quotes. Rather, they correlate with price contemporaneously, and with future price, only to the extent that they correlate with the ‡ow information that does drive quoted price proximately, namely market-wide interdealer ‡ow. Put di¤erently, ‡ow information from a given bank is both more informative than the interdealer ‡ow available to the whole market (in the sense that other banks to not observe Citibank's ‡ow mix), and less informative because the market has access to both interdealer ‡ow and other sources of information that are not available to researchers. Any structural model needs to account for this complex information structure.
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Applying the steady state kalman …ltering algorithm to this system gives:
where Y tjt denote estimates of Y t conditioned on fZ t ; Z t 1;:::: g = d t and v = E[V t V 0 t ]: Now let { be a 1 8 vector that picks out the …rst element in Y t : We can write the log price of FX quote at the start of month t + 1 as
Next, note that {A = {; so the …rst term on the right is {Y tjt = s t . Making this substitution and using the equation for Z t gives us 
Direct calculations also verify that {KCBV t+1 = u t+1 ; {KCA 0 V t = v t + " t ; and {KCA 1 V t 1 = (1 )v t 1 " t 1 : Hence, (18) has the same form as equation (14) in the text.
